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Abstract 
How could the initial, drastic decisions to implement “lockdowns” to control the spread of 
COVID-19 infections be justifiable, when they were made on the basis of such uncertain 
evidence? We defend the imposition of lockdowns in some countries by first, and focusing on 
the UK, looking at the evidence that undergirded the decision, second, arguing that this provided 
us with sufficient grounds to restrict liberty given the circumstances, and third, defending the use 
of poorly-empirically-constrained epidemiological models as tools that can legitimately guide 
public policy. 
1. Introduction 
The initial months of the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic posed an extraordinary challenge to policy-
makers. By March 2020, just two months after the virus was first detected, governments around 
the world were faced with a drastic decision: implement far-reaching, often unprecedented 
restrictions on the entire populace, or risk exponential viral growth, and potentially, significant 
numbers of deaths and the collapse of healthcare systems? The difficulty of these decisions was 
exacerbated by the fact that the implications—on both sides—were highly uncertain. The nature 
of the threat posed by the pandemic, the degree to which restrictions would be effective, and the 
costs that these restrictions might exact were all estimated on the basis of emerging and uncertain 
evidence. This was further complicated by the fact that proposed mitigation measures involved 
severe restrictions upon liberty that we generally only regard as justifiable under a very narrow set 
of circumstances. 
Decisions concerning pandemic control can now, over 18 months in, be evaluated by utilizing 
something more akin to a cost-benefit analysis.1 Questions about the justifiability or necessity of 
restrictions upon liberty and economic activity (among other measures) can be subject to 
inclusive and sustained deliberation. Although we remain in an extraordinary position, the degree 
of uncertainty and seeming immediacy of the situation that marked the beginning of the 
pandemic, and the climate under which the initial policy decisions were made, posed a distinctive 
challenge. Is it possible, under these distinctive circumstances, to justify such drastic interventions 
at all? Here, we mount a defense of the initial imposition of “lockdowns”, focusing particularly 
on the UK (whose decision-making process was particularly well documented), but that should 
extend to countries with similar features. By lockdowns, we mean combinations of policies aimed 
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at slowing viral spread, by reducing contact between members of the population. These might 
include bans on gatherings, the closure of businesses, workplaces, schools or universities, 
restrictions upon when and for what purpose individuals can leave their place of residence, and 
so on. A common feature of these measures is that they apply to the population as a whole, and 
that non-compliance can be penalized.2  
We proceed with our defense, first, by briefly presenting the sort of evidence available leading up 
to the time when the initial decision to lock down was made, focusing particularly on the 
evidence supporting three key propositions: first, that the viral reproduction number R must 
remain below 1 to avoid exceeding healthcare capacity, second, that lockdown was required in 
order to keep R below 1, and third, that an initial period of lockdown would not generate damage 
exceeding any benefit. We will then address two objections to the imposition of lockdowns on 
the basis of this emerging evidence. First, that it was not justifiable to limit people’s liberty on 
these grounds, and second, that mathematical modelling evidence that played a central role in 
motivating the imposition of lockdowns was so poor that it could not undergird policy decisions. 
2. March 2020 – lead up to lockdown 
On January 5, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) first reported an increase in cases of 
pneumonia, of unknown cause, in Wuhan, linked to a wholesale seafood and live animal market 
(WHO2020a). Samples from these patients confirmed that the cause of these cases was a 
previously unknown coronavirus, of probable bat origin (Zhou et al. 2020, Zhu et al. 2020). By 
the end of January, there were 2,794 laboratory-confirmed infections in Wuhan, 80 of which had 
died (Zhou et al. 2020). The fatality rate of a new virus is always difficult to gauge, due to 
selection bias—the cases initially identified tend to be the more serious ones. But once further 
data became available, in early March (based on cases among expatriates on flights out from 
Wuhan, and passengers of the Diamond Princess cruise ship), the infection fatality rate was 
estimated to be 0.66% - substantially higher than that of recent influenza pandemics (Verity et al. 
2020). 
The “Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies” (SAGE), the UK group that played a crucial 
role in the eventual implementation of lockdown, held their first, “precautionary” meeting to 
discuss COVID-19 on January 22, noting some evidence of person-to-person transmission, but 
also emphasizing the uncertainty surrounding almost all aspects of the virus (Birch 2021; SAGE 
2020a). By the end of January, estimates of the basic reproduction number of the virus indicated 
 




sustained human-to-human transmission (Wu et al. 2020), “leav[ing] open the possibility for 
pandemic circulation of this new virus” (Riou and Althaus 2020, 3). The virus had, by this stage, 
spread throughout China, to some neighboring countries, and the first case had been diagnosed 
in the US (WHO 2020b). The first two cases in the UK were detected in the last week of January 
(Moss et al. 2020) and began spreading exponentially (Anderson et al. 2020). 
As the virus continued to spread exponentially in the UK, worries about the overburdening of 
the National Health Service (NHS) began to arise. On February 26, SAGE stated that “without 
action, the NHS will be unable to meet all demands placed on it”, and that “[d]emand on beds is 
likely to overtake supply well before the peak is reached” (SAGE 2020c).3 At this time, however, 
SAGE continued to advocate a combination of measures that would slow the spread of the 
disease, but stopped short of bringing the reproduction number under 1. A key shift occurred in 
the SAGE meeting on March 18, precipitated by two main new pieces of evidence. While 
continuing to emphasise the uncertainty regarding all of their conclusions, SAGE now estimated 
that “the UK is 2 to 4 weeks behind Italy in terms of the epidemic curve” (SAGE 2020d) – Italy, 
at the time, was the hardest hit country in Europe, and their healthcare system was close to 
collapse (Armocida et al. 2020). The second key piece of evidence was a report containing 
mathematical modelling projections of epidemic development contingent on different policy 
responses – the much-discussed “Report 9” by the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team 
(Ferguson et al. 2020). This report, released two days before the meeting, suggested that the 
current mitigation-based measures pursued by the UK would lead to healthcare capacity being 
exceeded several times over. In order to avoid this, the report stressed that a “suppression-based” 
strategy, with the aim of reducing the reproduction number to under 1, must be pursued as soon 
as possible.  
Although it’s only alluded to in the March 18 meeting (SAGE 2020d), there was further 
indication that lockdown-type measures could have a significant effect on transmission rates 
(Kucharski et al. 2020; Lau et al. 2020; SAGE 2020b). On February 25, SAGE noted that 
available evidence from Wuhan, Hong Kong and Singapore indicated that lockdown measures 
could reduce the reproduction number to 1, and suggested that such measures could be 
realistically implemented in the UK (SAGE 2020b). The notion that lockdowns could make a 
difference in staying within the bounds of ICU capacity also received further support by a study 
comparing Wuhan (which imposed lockdown late) with Guangzhou (which implemented 
 
3 The NHS also lacked sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE) – as contingency plans had focused on the 
possibility of an influenza epidemic, “there was too little PPE and too much of it was of the wrong kinds for this 




lockdown measures early) (Li et al. 2020), suggesting not just that lockdowns could play a pivotal 
role in keeping healthcare demand within capacity, but also emphasizing that the timing of the 
intervention is crucial. On March 18 SAGE notes that, although we cannot be sure that strict 
measures in pursuit of epidemic suppression are necessary, “[i]f the interventions are required, it 
would be better to act early” (2020d). 
On the strength of Report 9, SAGE recommended school closures (2020d), which were 
implemented across much of the UK on 20 March (BBC 2020). The rest of the suppression-
based recommendations in Report 9 were also adopted as policy by the UK government 
immediately after the release of this report (Boseley 2020; van Basshuysen and White 
forthcoming). In order to achieve a drastic reduction in social contact, measures including the 
closure of businesses, the dispersal of gatherings of more than two people, and strict restrictions 
on the purposes for which individuals may leave their homes were mandated on March 23, with 
fines imposed for non-compliance (Gov.UK 2020).  
This, then, gives us a sense of the evidence marshalled in support of (or available to support) the 
initial institution of lockdowns in the UK. But this, of course, only addresses one side of the 
equation. It was clear that such drastic interventions could potentially have significant, disruptive 
impacts, that may, in some cases, be difficult to predict. How might these detrimental effects 
compare to those of unsuppressed proliferation of the virus? There was some evidence to suggest 
that areas that had embraced stricter control measures had ultimately fared better economically 
during the 1918 influenza pandemic, but this result could not straightforwardly be generalised to 
the COVID pandemic (Correia et al. 2020).  
There were, however, further considerations to suggest that lockdown measures might constitute 
the lesser of two evils. First, some of the detrimental impacts that might be feared as a result of 
lockdown measures, such as spikes in unemployment (Gupta et al. 2020), and the closure of 
businesses (Bartik et al. 2020) had already preceded the implementation of official measures; the 
associated costs would have accordingly accrued with or without lockdown. Second, although it 
would be impossible to completely contain the detrimental effects of lockdown measures, 
governments could have expected, at least, that some of the worst impacts could be mitigated, 
through the use of measures such as the provision of loans or benefits, moratoria on debt 
repayments, additional protections for tenants, economic stimulus measures and so on. Indeed, it 
might be expected that, as the pandemic had been so economically disruptive even prior to the 
implementation of lockdowns, many of these measures would be required in any case. Finally, 




detrimental impacts. Although, again, this would not present a means of containing all harm 
caused, it stood in contrast to a decision not to impose lockdowns, where the available evidence 
indicated that immediate action could have significant impacts, and even delaying the decision by 
a couple of weeks could result in damaging and irreversible outcomes. 
This, we must stress, applies only to affluent countries, similar to the UK, that could expect to 
successfully implement lockdown mitigation measures, and where it could be reasonably 
expected that the implementation of lockdowns would not result in a public health catastrophe of 
its own (see Broadbent 2020). This is also, as we have emphasized, focused on the initial decision 
to impose these measures, under conditions of uncertainty and unpreparedness. This does not 
suggest that governments were not obligated to continue to gather evidence, to revise and revoke 
policies as more evidence emerged, and to seek out and develop less burdensome methods of 
epidemic control (see White and van Basshuysen 2021, forthcoming). One might also suggest 
that governments should be held responsible for insufficient preparedness for a pandemic of this 
scale, and that such drastic measures would not have been necessary if, for example, adequate 
contingency plans had been attended to before the event – we regard this claim as compatible 
with the contention that, given the circumstances that they found themselves in, governments 
could be justified in the initial decision to impose lockdown measures. 
Our short retelling here is intended to suggest that, even given the uncertainty surrounding 
features of the epidemic and the efficacy and harmful effects of lockdowns, that the emerging 
evidence, particularly concerning the drastic difference that early action could effectuate, could 
justify the government’s initial decision to take these unprecedented steps. But to properly defend 
this claim, we now turn to two objections to acting on this evidence. The first is an ethical 
concern with the circumstances under which these restrictions can be justified – that these 
tentative and uncertain grounds cannot constitute sufficient reason to restrict people’s basic 
liberties. The second is an epistemic concern with the mathematical modelling evidence that 
formed important evidentiary support for these decisions – this evidence, some hold, was so 
poor, that it shouldn’t be given any epistemic weight at all. Let’s proceed, then, to each objection 
in turn. 
3. We can’t restrict liberty on these grounds! 
We can find a potential argument against the initial imposition of lockdowns in many parts of the 
world in a paper by Eric Winsberg et al. (2020). In a nutshell, they contend that “freedom [is] the 
default from which departures must be justified; the greater the imposition, the stronger the 




coercive measures, can indeed be justified, this is only the case when very high epistemic 
standards are met. In the early stages of the pandemic, when evidence was emerging and 
uncertain, governments could not meet the high epistemic bar required for the intrusions upon 
liberty entailed by lockdown policies.  
It is difficult to answer, in a precise manner, the question of just how much evidence we need to 
justify the kinds of severe restrictions on liberty that lockdown policies generally entail. However, 
by looking at limits of the liberal democratic principle privileging individual liberty over other 
concerns in most circumstances, and the specific features of a pandemic situation, we can sketch 
an account of the general circumstances under which restrictions of liberty may be thought to be 
justifiable. We will suggest, in this section, that although the above stipulation is indeed 
compelling in normal circumstances, there are a couple of reasons to think that these 
requirements do not apply to these particular circumstances. We will draw this out by scrutinizing 
each part of the stipulation in turn; first, that liberty is always the default, and second, that high 
levels of justification are always required to override it. 
We will proceed by first looking at where restrictions of liberty are normally justified – when 
conduct causes harm to others (the “harm principle”). We will argue that going about one’s daily 
business in a normally self-regarding way poses unacceptable risk of harm to others during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and thus that the harm principle can justify restrictions on liberty under 
these circumstances. But there is another issue here, which the previous section has already 
acquainted us with: particularly at the beginning of the pandemic, the magnitude and likelihood 
of the harm that would ensue from such conduct was difficult to gauge – the evidence was 
emerging and uncertain. We will contend, however, that where the risk of harm is imminent – 
that is, where there is reason to believe that immediate action is required to avoid harm, the high 
evidentiary bar we might normally require to justify policies involving such drastic measures as 
the restriction of liberty needs to be relaxed somewhat.  
That is, policies falling under the broad moniker of lockdowns might be justifiable even on the 
basis of uncertain evidence when two conditions are met: unacceptable risk of harm (to others), 
and urgency. This is not to say that no evidence at all is required for the institution of such policies 
– just that these two conditions might require altering the normal moral and epistemic standards 
to which justified policy-making must be held. Or, more specifically, where normal conduct in a 
pandemic poses risk of harm to others, this might cause us to alter our presumptive privileging of 
individual liberty, and when a situation is urgent, it might lead us to relax our epistemic standards for 




So, to begin, under what circumstances can we justifiably circumscribe the liberty of individuals? 
Almost all liberal theorists suggest that liberty should be limited by the “harm principle”, 
summarized here by Joel Feinberg: 
state interference with a citizen’s behavior tends to be morally justified when it is 
reasonably necessary… to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk of harm to parties 
other than the person interfered with. More concisely, the need to prevent harm…to 
parties other than the actor is always an appropriate reason for legal coercion (1984, 
11). 
Feinberg goes so far as to say that “no responsible liberal theorist denies the validity of the harm 
principle” (1984, 14). We can see similar stipulations in liberal public health ethics frameworks, 
such as that of James Childress et al., who contend that the voluntary conduct of citizens may be 
justifiably restricted by coercive means “to reduce or prevent the imposition of serious risk onto 
others (2002, 175).  
It should be noted that, in each of the stipulations above, one does not have to intend to cause 
harm for the restriction of liberty to be justified – the risk of unwittingly passing a dangerous 
virus onto others could qualify as putting others at risk of harm (see also Brennan 2018; Flanigan 
2014; Frowe 2020). But not all exposure of others to risk is straightforwardly unacceptable—this 
would make the principle much too broad. We allow some exposure of others to risk all the 
time—we don’t forbid people from driving, for instance, even though they put others on the 
road at risk by doing so (Hansson 2003). This is reflected in the definitions of both Feinberg and 
Childress et al.—for Feinberg, it is the “unreasonable risk of harm” that justifies restrictions upon 
liberty, while for Childress et al., it is “the imposition of serious risk”. How, then, might we 
determine whether the risk posed by going about one’s business in a pandemic constitutes the 
type of unreasonable or serious risk that can justify restrictions upon liberty? 
One suggestion for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable risk comes from risk 
theorist Sven Ove Hansson. He proposes that “[e]xposure of a person to a risk is acceptable if 
and only if this exposure is part of an equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her 
advantage” (2003, 305). The idea here is in exchange for being exposed to risk by, for example, 
others being able to drive a car, I am also allowed to drive a car and expose others to the 
attendant risks. This is justifiable because, we might presume, it is to everyone’s benefit. 
So is potentially exposing yourself, and then others, to the risk of contracting a potentially serious 
virus a case of unacceptable risk? Jason Brennan presents us with a fictional case that might lead 




Elon Musk has just invented instantaneous interplanetary teleportation, and the 
technology is widely available. Suppose a group of privately-funded astronauts plans 
to visit a newly discovered planet, a planet that, for all they know, contains a wide 
range of deadly bacteria and viruses. When they arrive, they drink the water, without 
sanitizing it. They also give the possibly contaminated water to their children. When 
they arrive back home a day later, they refuse quarantine. Some of them visit 
Disneyland, while others immediately place their (for all they know, infected) 
children in daycare centers or schools. They could have taken steps to sanitize the 
water samples and to prevent themselves from contracting any alien diseases, but 
they decided not to do so, because they get their health advice from Jenny McCarthy 
(2018, 41). 
The astronauts’ conduct, according to Brennan, involves active exposure of others to risk of 
harm, and this risk cannot be regarded as acceptable because others do not benefit from the 
astronauts’ refusal to take precautions. Because of this, he believes that the forcible quarantine of 
the reckless astronauts is justifiable. 
There are, however, two ways in which we might want to question this analogy, when we carry it 
over to general restrictions in response to COVID-19. First, Brennan’s case might be thought to 
provide an argument for the justifiability of quarantine measures – that is, measures targeted at 
specific individuals whom we judge as particularly likely to pose some risk (due to, for example, 
their direct exposure to potential disease vectors), but this argument might not extend to general 
restrictions. If what we are considering is placing restrictions on everyone in order to reduce risk, 
we might think that the lack of these restrictions could in fact be mutually beneficial. 4 In 
exchange for being free to go about my daily business in a pandemic, potentially exposing you to 
the virus, you are free to go about your normal activities, potentially exposing me to the virus. 
This, then, might be more like driving a car than quarantine – everyone exposes each other to 
risk, but within an equitable system that works to the advantage of all. 
When it comes to COVID-19, or any other epidemic with potentially serious and widespread 
consequences, this line of thinking could fall apart for two reasons. The first is due to the fact 
that certain parts of the population – the elderly, people with various comorbidities, and so on – 
are not likely to feel free to share in the benefit of going about their business unaffected (see 
 
4 Brennan’s case might actually run into similar problems in the context of the purpose for which it is used – to 
provide an argument for general mandatory vaccination measures. One might similarly say here that the freedom to 
refuse vaccinations (or other medical treatment) and expose others to risk is justifiable because the same 
freedom/advantage is extended to everyone. Of course, mandatory vaccination advocates might question the idea 
that vaccination refusal works to the advantage of anyone who is not a vaccine skeptic, and thus can’t be regarded as 
a “reciprocally beneficial right” (Hansson 2003, 304). This is less plausible in the case of restrictions concerning 





Flanigan 2014). Certain groups of people are at a much higher risk of serious complications or 
death,5 and many might feel forced to isolate themselves in order to avoid taking on this risk. 
Activities that may be unavoidable, like grocery shopping, become more risky for these groups of 
people in this environment, with no corresponding benefit. Even if they take all possible 
measures to avoid contact with others, their risk of exposure is nonetheless increased by allowing 
the spread of a virus through the community. Due to the disparate effects of the virus on 
different groups, we might question whether this amounts to an equitable exchange of risks that 
works to everyone’s advantage. 
One could ask here if this argument might not also apply to the seasonal flu. It is difficult to draw 
a hard line in terms of degree of risk here, and to balance risks and benefits to determine what in 
fact should be seen as working to the advantage of all. We might think, for example, even for the 
susceptible, the comparatively small risk of contracting and developing complications from a 
seasonal flu might still lead them to see going about their business free of restrictions as 
ultimately being to their benefit. But even if we doubt this, there is another distinguishing factor 
presented by the COVID-19 pandemic—the propensity of poorly-prepared healthcare systems to 
become overwhelmed in the absence of adequate mitigation measures. If there is reason to 
believe that this will happen, this introduces a new set of risks into the equation—the increased 
risk that individuals will be unable to access necessary medical care. When we take these 
additional risks into account, it becomes even less plausible that this exposure to risk ultimately 
should be regarded as working to each person’s overall benefit.  
Second, it should be noted that Brennan’s example involves a highly uncertain risk. We have no 
idea whether the astronauts do indeed expose themselves to serious communicable diseases on 
Mars, and thus no means of gauging the risk they do in fact pose. But we might want to be a bit 
more stringent than this, and say that people should indeed avoid exposing others to risk of 
serious harm, and that this can justify state interference with liberty, but only when we have good 
grounds to believe that there is in fact a serious risk. Perhaps, we might further think, we lacked 
sufficient evidence, at the start of the pandemic, to gauge the level of risk that the virus did in fact 
pose, and thus the evidence to justify interference with liberty. 
As we have seen in the previous section, we did have some reason to believe that COVID-19 had 
the potential to kill more people than the seasonal flu, spread more virulently, and overwhelm 
health care systems. But the evidence at this time was emerging, and uncertain. Although, by the 
 





time that the decision to implement lockdown measures was made in the UK it was clear that 
COVID-19 was spreading exponentially, we could only estimate just how infectious and deadly it 
was, and whether lockdown measures were really required in order to avoid the worst 
consequences of viral spread. To return to the quote with which we opened this section: “the 
greater the imposition [on people’s liberties], the stronger the justification needed” (2020, 222)”. 
Our argument thus far in this section has relied on the severity of the consequences of letting 
COVID-19 spread without serious mitigation measures – that due to the magnitude and nature 
of these risks, we cannot think of the lack of restrictions as mutually advantageous risk exposure. 
But can we justify such severe impositions on the liberties of entire populations on the basis of 
the limited evidence that we had concerning these potential consequences? Did policy-makers 
have an epistemic duty to gather more evidence, and to establish these conclusions to a higher 
degree of certainty, before making such radical decisions? 
While positing this as an epistemic duty might make sense in normal circumstances, it is difficult 
to maintain that we should uphold such a duty under these particular circumstances. The 
admittedly limited evidence available to us in early March suggested not just risk of potentially 
serious consequences, but that this risk was imminent—and the imminence of danger might 
require acting upon different norms to those that apply in regular circumstances (see Walzer 
1988). Here, this might require the revision of our usual epistemic norms (cf. Birch 2021). The 
reason for this is obvious—in situations in which risk is imminent, refraining from action until 
further data is gathered can effectively preclude the possibility of acting to mitigate the potential 
harm. As Tom Sorell notes, “the importance of minimising significant harm is usually reflected in 
the appropriateness of longer and more careful practical deliberation than usual—precisely what 
unexpected emergency rules out. In unexpected emergencies one is usually forced to decide 
quickly when the stakes are high” (2003, 24). The kind of decision-making norms that we might 
normally require in a liberal democratic society; further evidence gathering, inclusive deliberation, 
and so on, can be precluded in these circumstances. There was some evidence in March 2020, as 
documented in the previous section, to suggest that immediate action was required in order to 
avoid hospital systems being overwhelmed, and even small decision-making delays would make it 
impossible to avoid this outcome. There must be some legitimate provision, when we have 
reason to believe that harm is imminent, to act on the evidence available to us, or we have no 
means of acting quickly when it is the only way of avoiding catastrophic consequences.6 
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This, of course, does not suggest that policy makers have no further duties to continue to gather 
evidence, both about the danger they are responding to, and the impact of implemented policy 
measures.7 This was emphasized by epidemiologist John Ioannidis, who became a leading figure 
in the US in calls for caution concerning lockdowns, and the need for more and better data (more 
on this below). Despite this, however, Ioannidis maintained that “I think lockdown was justified 
as an initial response, given what little we knew about this new virus” (2020). This displays, we 
contend, that something is going wrong with the application of normal epistemic standards to 
urgent situations—it is precisely because we knew so little that Ioannidis took the initial decision 
to be justified. In addition, as noted above, this does not abrogate policy-makers’ responsibilities 
to mitigate the burdens imposed on citizens in their attempts to avoid imminent risk, and to seek 
out less burdensome alternatives. For example, an aggressive digital contact tracing regime may 
have been preferable to continuing lockdowns (White and van Basshuysen 2021, forthcoming), 
but at the very beginnings of an emergency situation like a pandemic, where there is no time to 
put such infrastructure in place, our options for action are limited. To summarize, then, the 
COVID-19 pandemic represents an unusual instance where our normal self-regarding conduct 
poses unacceptable risk of harm to others—thus restrictions on liberty are justifiable. Although 
estimations of the magnitude and nature of harm were, in the early months of the pandemic, 
based only on emerging and uncertain evidence, the necessity of provisions for acting quickly 
where potential harm is imminent should lead us to relax the epistemic standards to which we 
normally hold policy-makers when there is time for further evidence gathering and extensive 
deliberation. 
4. The evidence was too poor to have any epistemic weight! 
But this is all premised on the idea that there was some evidence which could provide a basis for 
thinking we were faced with this sort of imminent threat, and that lockdown was a necessary 
means of avoiding it. One type of evidence, as we have seen, that played a prominent role in the 
justification of lockdown policies (although it should be stressed that that this was just one type 
of evidence considered by scientists and policy-makers) was evidence based on epidemiological 
models. Some researchers, however, have criticized the use of these models in policy decisions so 
 
term. But that does not mean we can do away with extraordinary provisions for extraordinary circumstances entirely 
(see Sorell 2003, also Brennan 2018 for a similar argument about government failure). 
7 One analogy provided by Winsberg et al. in their defense of high epistemic standards is of holding a suspect for an 
extended period of time without sufficient evidence for a conviction. We might see the initial imposition of 
lockdown, to extend this analogy, as akin to holding someone for 24 hours before bringing charges against them – 
arguably justifiable in the short term as necessary evidence is gathered – but only justifiable longer term where 




heavily, that one might worry whether the putative evidence such models were able to provide 
was too poor to guide policy decisions at all, even in extreme circumstances.  
Ideally, the performance of models used to inform policy choices will have been adequately 
tested before the models’ predictions are passed on to policy-makers, the data that are input into 
the models will have been shown to be reliable, and models will only be used for purposes for 
which their adequacy has been well-confirmed. But last March, when governments in many 
countries were faced with the difficult question whether to impose social-distancing measures to 
slow the spread of SARS-CoV-2, models were just being developed, many of the parameters in 
the models were not empirically well-constrained, and there were not yet sufficient performance 
tests available to confirm the adequacy of these models for providing information upon which 
public policy decisions could be based. 
Moreover, as empirical evidence was emerging, it seemed to some that the evidence that did exist 
showed that models were too inaccurate to be useful or even, as one critic claims in the case of 
so-called SIR models, “completely and totally wrong” (Cochrane 2020). Similarly, a group of 
epidemiologists argued that the performance of models, at least early on in the pandemic, was too 
inadequate for modeling results to be passed on to policy-makers, and that more performance 
tests ought to be performed “before their results are provided to policy makers and public health 
officials” (Chin et al 2020). Winsberg et al. similarly maintain that COVID-19 models are 
“flawed” (2020, 216), and ask why "so many expert epidemiologists fail so badly, or rely on 
speculative parameters within their models" (2020, 229). Was the evidence provided by models 
then perhaps too poor to be taken into account at all? In this section we discuss the uses to 
which epidemiological models (and scientific models more generally) can be put in guiding policy 
decisions. We will survey the different kinds of evidence that models are able to provide and 
argue that, contrary to what the critics charged, the preliminary and uncertain evidence provided 
by epidemiological models early in the pandemic was able to play a legitimate role in informing 
policy decisions, even while exhibiting some of the putative flaws to which the critics drew 
attention. 
We can distinguish three types of epidemiological models that played a role in policy debates 
during the pandemic (see also Fuller 2021). The simplest models, so-called “SIR” or “SEIR” or 
compartment models, provide population-level, highly idealized representations of how diseases 
spread. These models assign members of a population to three or four compartments, “the 
susceptible”, “infectious”, “removed/recovered”, and, in the case of SEIR models, also the 




deterministic equations, how the sizes of the different compartments change with time. 
Compartment models treat populations as a whole, abstracting from interactions among 
individuals and individual transmission events. An example of a SEIR model is the SQUIRE 
model used by researchers at the Imperial College London to model the global evolution of the 
pandemic in different regions of the world (Walker et al. 2020). 
The second type of model used to model the spread of SARS-CoV-2 are individual-level or agent-
based models, in which individuals are assigned to different types of location where contacts 
occur—within households, at school, in the workplace or in the wider community—and then 
movements of individuals between these locations and transmission events through contacts 
among individuals are modeled. Agent-based models may be deterministic or add a stochastic or 
random element. In the latter case, different runs of the same model will lead to different 
projections of how infections spread. The CovidSim model discussed in Report 9 (Ferguson et al. 
2020)—the results of which, as we have seen, played an important role in the initial decision to 
implement lockdowns in the UK—is a stochastic, individual-level model. As input into this type 
of model, modelers construct a “synthetic population” with characteristics that closely resemble 
what survey data reveal about the actual population modeled. In contrast with compartment 
models, individual-based models are extremely complex, and contain a very large number of 
parameters. Thus, one challenge modelers face in constructing individual-based models is to gain 
access to data that are rich enough to allow the model parameters to be sufficiently constrained 
empirically. And, indeed, one of the criticisms levied against the use of models in policy decisions 
early on in the pandemic was that models had to rely on insufficient data and, hence, could not 
avoid making speculative parameter choices.  
A third, somewhat newer type of model are data-driven models; less theoretical models that 
essentially engage in curve-fitting, i.e. plotting a curve to fit what are generally very large data-sets 
to predict the course of the pandemic. The IHME model (IHME COVID-19 health service 
utilization forecasting team 2020) that was used as a basis for some national policy decisions in 
the U.S. (Begley 2020) is such a data-driven model. One challenge in the application of such 
models is to determine the conditions under which the output of a model that is constructed as 
the best fit for the evolution of the pandemic in one geographic location at one time can be 
applied in a different context.   
How adequate were these various models as a guide for public policy? The models’ critics tend to 
compare model outcomes with the actual epidemic outcomes and conclude from a poor fit that 




suggests that the only purpose of models is to predict outcomes as precisely as possible. But this 
is too narrow in two senses: first in the demand for maximal precision as the hallmark of success, 
and second in the restriction of models as tools for prediction. 
Beginning with the first sense, it is a by now well-rehearsed point that every model idealizes its 
target system in certain respects and abstracts from some of the target system’s properties (see 
e.g. Cartwright 1983). There is no ‘perfect model’ that represents all features of its target system 
and does so completely accurately. A model may be adequate for predicting one range of 
quantities, even while it is not adequate for predicting the values of other quantities. And what 
counts as sufficient precision is dependent on the context in which a model is used: a model may 
be useful for making coarse-grained, order-of-magnitude, or merely qualitative predictions, even 
where it is not adequate for predicting more precise numerical values. 
Moreover, and this is the second sense, models can be used for purposes other than making 
predictions. It is customary to distinguish predictions or forecasts that are statements concerning of 
the values of quantities in the actual world from projections that use non-actual counterfactual 
inputs (either initial conditions or non-actual parameter values) to output the value of some 
quantity under counterfactual circumstances. Projections, that is, are conditional predictions 
(Fuller 2021; Schroeder 2021). Projections aim to examine how the values of certain quantities 
depend on a particular choice of model structure, of initial conditions, and of parameter values. A 
well-known example of projections are climate projections, which explore how global mean 
surface temperatures evolve under different radiative forcing scenarios and emission pathways. 
Now, some of the criticisms of pandemic models are the result of treating highly idealized 
projections as predictions, or of not paying sufficient attention to the counterfactual assumptions 
on which a projection is conditioned. Many models abstract from spontaneous or endogenous 
changes to social interactions, and do not distinguish between policy decisions and their full 
implementation. This abstraction, naively speaking, gets something ‘wrong’ about the world: 
policy decisions do not directly cause infection rates to drop, but rather do so only by having an 
effect on individuals’ behaviors (such as the number and kind of contacts people have). 
Moreover, there is evidence that people do and did adjust their behavior not only in response to 
policy interventions but also in response to information about the spread of the virus (see Gupta 
et al. 2020). Because SIR models do not incorporate these factors, the Stanford economist 
Cochrane claims they are “completely and totally wrong” (Cochrane 2020). Yet this criticism has 
force only if the highly idealized and abstract models were indeed meant to provide fully accurate 




As a second example, consider Winsberg et al. (forthcoming), who have criticized the CovidSim 
model in Report 9 (Ferguson et al 2020) for claiming that the pandemic could result 
approximately two million deaths in the U.S., maintaining that this claim is wildly exaggerated and 
overly pessimistic. Yet it is not the case that CovidSim “predicted 2.2 million deaths in the US by 
August 2020 without strict mitigation measures” (forthcoming, 4) as Winsberg et al. claim. 
Rather, the model projected approximately 2 million total deaths in the US “In the (unlikely) 
absence of any control measures or spontaneous changes in individual behaviour” (Ferguson et 
al. 2020, 6). That is, this number was a projection for a do-nothing, worst-case scenario under the 
counterfactual assumption that nobody adjusts their behavior at all in response to the spread of the 
virus (see also van Basshuysen and White 2021). This projection functions as a counterfactual 
limiting case of the death toll under a completely uncontained spread of the virus—an unrealistic 
limiting case, as all parties agree, but one that may nevertheless play a role in anchoring our 
perceptions of the severity of the threat posed by the virus. 
While the distinction between predictions and projections is important, it is not as sharp as is 
sometimes suggested, since all models are, in some sense, projections. Since all models involve 
idealizations and abstractions, and no model provides a complete and completely accurate 
representation of the actual system modeled, all models make what invariably will involve non-
actual, counterfactual assumptions about the structure and dynamics of a system, and then 
project how quantities characterizing the system will evolve under these assumptions. A 
projection can be used as a prediction, if we take the idealizations and abstractions to be such 
that, in a given context and for a particular purpose, the model’s projections allow us to make 
predictive inferences about the values of certain quantities in the actual world. It is thus a mistake 
to criticize a model projection simply by pointing out that the model’s structure and parameters 
do not fully accurately represent the actual world. But we may criticize a projection for its failure 
to match an actual outcome to a certain degree of accuracy, if the modeling inputs and the 
model’s structure are intended to adequately represent certain features of an actual system to this 
degree of accuracy. It is therefore crucial in evaluating a model to pay careful attention to the 
(counterfactual) modeling assumptions and evaluate these in the context of the models’ intended 
use. 
What degree of accuracy could we have reasonably demanded of epidemiological models, 
especially toward the beginning of the pandemic in 2020? The models’ critics are surely right that 
many of the parameter choices in the models were not well-constrained by empirical evidence, 




absence of strong empirical constraints for parameter choices many modeling choices had to be 
based on expert judgment. Yet these judgments were not mere guesses, since epidemiologists had 
prior experience modeling epidemics, compartment models had been widely used, and the 
Imperial College’s agent-based model CovidSim was not a new model (originally having been 
developed originally to model a flu outbreak in Southeast Asia).  
Moreover, by March 2020, preliminary evidence on how SarsCov-2 spreads was available, 
allowing for somewhat empirically constrained educated guesses of many of the modeling 
parameters. To be sure, modeling results that had to rely heavily on educated guesses and expert 
judgment are clearly less credible than results based on more tightly empirically constrained 
inputs. Given the dearth of empirical data on SarsCov-2, especially during the first months of 
2020, it would have been a mistake to treat model outputs as offering numerically precise 
predictions of infection and fatality rates, or of the strengths of the causal effects of non-
pharmaceutical interventions on these rates. But this does not mean that modeling predictions 
had no epistemic relevance. Rather, instead of taking models as sources of precise quantitative 
predictions, modelers and policy makers were warranted in taking model outputs to provide 
coarse-grained, order of magnitude, or qualitative information about the spread of Sars-Cov-2 
and to underwrite qualitative conclusions like “only suppression, and not mitigation, can prevent 
hospital resources from being overwhelmed”, as Jonathan Birch has suggested (in conversation).  
We see here one possible role for projections in policy advice, since Birch’s conclusion cannot 
merely be based on a single prediction, but requires a comparison of different projections with 
different input parameters. More generally, policy deliberations require exploring projections of 
the consequences of different (counterfactual) policy choices. Comparing different projections 
that result from varying the value of some parameter may also be part of a sensitivity or 
robustness analysis. If we are uncertain about the value of a particular input parameter in a 
model, then it is important to know how sensitive the model output is to variations in the value 
of this parameter. If the output of a model does not vary significantly with changes in the value 
of a parameter, then it is less problematic if the actual value of this parameter is not well 
constrained empirically. For example, (Edeling et al. 2020) show that the CovidSim model is 
particularly sensitive to variations in just three parameters8 and that variations in these 
parameters’ values are very likely to result in projections of the same order of magnitude. This 
 
8 The parameters representing the length of the latent period in which a patient has no symptoms and is not 





suggests that CovidSim is a useful tool for making order-of-magnitude projections even if more 
fine-grained predictions were not to be reliable.  
Yet another purpose for projections is to yield information about causal structures or 
mechanisms. Consider compartment models. In the first instance compartment models are 
merely dynamical models consisting of a number of equations governing how the sizes of the 
different compartments change with time. Read as standard mathematical equations, they inform 
us how values of quantities co-vary, but not which change in the values of a quantity causes what 
other change. But, if they can be given a causal interpretation, counterfactual manipulations of 
compartment models can be used to help judge the causal effectiveness of different interventions 
for preventing infections (see also Fuller 2021), and can thereby be decision relevant, even when 
the precise strengths of these effects are not known.  
As long, then, as we attend carefully to the purposes to which models can be put, and the type of 
information that we can draw from their projections when inputs are not empirically well-
constrained, COVID-19 models could indeed provide legitimate public policy guidance during 
the early months of the pandemic. 
5. Conclusion 
We have attempted to provide a defense of governments’ initial decisions to impose lockdowns 
(in affluent countries with certain features) in three stages. First, focusing particularly on the UK, 
we presented the evidence available (and drawn upon) in reaching this decision, suggesting that 
the government had some grounds to believe that instituting lockdown measures was an 
immediately required means of reducing the viral reproduction number to under 1, and thereby 
avoiding the collapse of the healthcare system. We suggested that although little was known 
about the potential adverse effects of such measures, there was also reason to believe that this 
initial decision would not result in harms outweighing unmitigated viral spread, due to the fact 
that some potential detrimental economic effects were being experienced prior to official 
lockdown measures, many detrimental effects could be mitigated, to a degree, by further policy 
measures, and the decision could be revised or revoked as evidence of harm emerged. 
We then turned to two objections to making such a drastic policy decision on this admittedly 
uncertain evidential basis. First, we addressed the concern that it is not justifiable to restrict 
people’s liberty on such tentative grounds, arguing that the risk of harm provided justification for 
restricting liberty, and that the urgency of the situation allowed for a relaxation of the normally 




addressed the contention that the modelling evidence that formed a key underpinning of policy 
decisions was too poor to function as a guide for policy. Although critics may be correct in 
maintaining that the models were constructed on the basis of limited and uncertain evidence, and 
that this can undermine their ability to give fine-grained predictions, we argued that poorly-
constrained epidemiological models can still function as a basis for policy advice, once we have a 
more nuanced idea of the purposes for which they can be used. Namely, they can underwrite 
qualitative or order-of-magnitude inferences about the course of the pandemic, and they can 
contribute to an understanding of the causal mechanisms governing the evolution of the spread 
of the virus. Although policy-makers found themselves in uncharted territory, forced to make 
drastic decisions with far-reaching implications under uncertainty and extreme time pressure, the 
availability of some legitimate, albeit tentative, evidence meant that they did not make these 
decisions completely blind.    
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